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Abstract
In spite of the fact that UN peacekeeping operations are a relative new field for scholarly re-
search, the literature on the subject has grown into a substantial body. This article distils from
this body of scholarly literature eleven clusters of factors for success and failure for UN
peacekeeping operations in general and tests these on four case studies – Cambodia, Mozam-
bique, Rwanda and El Salvador – of one particular type of UN peacekeeping operation: the
UN peace-building operations. It concludes that although the results of the four cases of UN
peace-building operations largely confirm the factors for success and failure as found in lit-
erature for UN peacekeeping operations in general, theory on UN peace-building operations
still needs adjustment and fine tuning. Amongst others, it appears from the cases that two
factors that receive a lot of attention in literature – the non-use of force by the operation and
the need for a clear and detailed mandate – are less important.
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Although in the media UN peacekeeping operations currently receive less attention than dur-
ing their heyday in the first half of the 1990s, they are again deployed in similar numbers and
at comparable scales. Typically, in spite of the fact that the first UN peacekeeping operation
was deployed shortly after the Second World War, only the last ten to fifteen years have they
become a more frequent subject of scholarly and policy oriented literature. Nonetheless, aca-
demics and policy makers have developed a number of factors for success and failure; these
are requirements that operations must meet to increase the chances that they successfully con-
tribute to durable peace. Durable peace is the achievement of negative peace and the suffi-
cient addressing of the causes of conflict. Additionally, negative peace is the absence of di-
rect physical violence, opposed to positive peace which entails more than only the absence of
physical violence. The concept of positive peace also directs attention to the causes of con-
flict, such as the presence of social justice, a fair distribution of power and resources, equal
protection and impartial enforcement of law.1
In order to qualify as a success in this article, the contribution of the operation must
have helped to establish ten years of negative peace and a positive development in remedying
the causes of the conflict. The article distils clusters of factors for success and failure from
the existing body of scholarly literature on UN peacekeeping operations in general and tests
these clusters on one particular kind of UN peacekeeping operation: UN peace-building op-
erations. For this purpose, UN peacekeeping operations are defined as those operations de-
ployed by the United Nations which the organization itself regards as UN peacekeeping op-
erations. To date, the UN has deployed 60 such operations under Chapter VI or Chapter VII
mandate.2 A UN peace-building operation is regarded as a UN peacekeeping operation that is
supposed to do more than maintain the status quo. It is also aimed at building an agreement-
based peace following an intrastate conflict. For that purpose it remains impartial towards the
signatories, but may not always have their consent.3
1 Johan Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’, Journal of Peace Research, vol.6, no.3, 1969, pp.167-
191.
2 United Nations Peacekeeping Homepage, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp, 13 November 2008.
3 The concepts of impartial and consent are used in the same way as in Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams and
Stuart Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004). They use a distinction of peace
operations which originates from the British Army, in which a peace keeping operation is both with the consent
3To begin this article, the most important general factors for success and failure of UN
peacekeeping operations, according to literature on the topic, is reviewed. Next, case studies
of UN peace-building operations are selected, which are also briefly assessed. Subsequently,
the factors for success and failure of UN peacekeeping operations are tested on four cases of
UN peace-building operations. The research for this part of the study was done both by litera-
ture and document study as well as through field research and interviews in all four countries
under review, in addition to New York. Finally, a review is made regarding the extent the
factors for success and failure of UN peacekeeping operations need adjustment in order to
apply to UN peace-building operations.
Factors for Success and Failure in UN Peacekeeping Operations: The Literature
From scholarly and lessons learned literature on UN peacekeeping operations the following
eleven clusters of factors for success and failure can be distilled.4 Although in the practise of
UN peacekeeping operations some additional lessons may have been learned these have not
yet fully penetrated the body of scholarly literature.
Consent, Willingness and Sincerity
The United Nations Secretariat calls the genuine desire on the part of combatants to resolve
their differences peacefully a prerequisite for the success of a peacekeeping operation.5 Doyle
and Sambanis find that an operation has the best chance for success if the parties have under-
lined their genuine desire for peace with a formal peace agreement.6 Consent is important
because if lost, the operation can only implement its mandate by military force. If an opera-
of the parties and impartial. Peace enforcement is still impartial but not necessarily with the consent of the par-
ties. A partial operation without the consent of the parties is war.
4 Although research points out that factors such as the duration and intensity of the conflict, the number of facti-
ons, the type of conflict (ethnic, identity, language, etc.) and the level of democracy and economic development
in the country are of great relevance to the chances for success, this research does not look at these endogenous
factors as they cannot be addressed by a UN peacekeeping operation. For good statistical research on these fac-
tors, see: V. Page Fortna, ‘Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace
after Civil War’, International Studies Quarterly, vol.48, no.2, 2004, pp.269-292; Michael W. Doyle and Nicho-
las Sambanis, Building Peace: Challenges and Strategies after Civil War (n.p.: World Bank, 1999); Michael W.
Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, ‘International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis’, Ameri-
can Political Science Review, vol.94, no.4, 2000, pp.779-801; and Birger Heldt, Conditions for Successful Intra-
state Peacekeeping Missions (n.p.: Uppsala University, 2001).
5 United Nations, Basic Facts about the United Nations (New York:  United  Nations  Department  of  Public  In-
formation, 2000).
4tion is then not longer regarded as impartial, this would mean that it would loose its peace-
keeping character and that it would cross the line into war fighting.7
According to many scholars the presence of a peacekeeping operation in a conflict al-
ters the situation on the ground. It forces the belligerents to recalculate the dangers and op-
portunities as a result  of the introduction of the new factor.  They argue that each party will
question whether the ‘road of peace’ still serves its best interests. The answer to this question
depends largely upon the belligerent’s momentum and military position. Each party will also
question whether it views the United Nations as the best vehicle to travel the road it chose.
Thus, the parties may view a peace process accompanied by a peacekeeping operation as a
desirable alternative for war, but they can also see the mission as a threat to their security and
interests. Nonetheless, even if an uncooperative party, or spoiler, chooses war, it can view the
operation as an opportunity to manipulate or recuperate. In such a case parties may be insin-
cere and break their promises later on. The choices parties make are thought to depend, in
large part, on the design, the type and the configuration of the mission. If the operation offers
a realistic peace they would be likely to react differently than if it is merely a token force.8
Moreover, sincerity at the time of signing a peace agreement is not regarded to be suf-
ficient  by  many scholars.  They  point  out  that  peace  agreements  also  often  bring  tensions  to
the surface within parties; the unity that was maintained for the sake of war can easily be lost
once peace breaks out. Peace can then frustrate the aims of certain parts of a coalition, giving
reasons for splinter groups to break away. In addition, even if a party sincerely intended to
reach peace, it most often did not do so unconditionally and can become disappointed. Sub-
sequently, it is often hard to distinguish disappointment from insincerity. Furthermore, such a
condition does not necessarily have to be publicly and explicitly stated in a peace agreement.
For example, União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), in Angola,
6 Doyle and Sambanis, Building Peace.
7 Gareth J. Evans, Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond (St. Leonards: Allen
and Unwin, 1993); Darya Pushkina, ‘Towards Successful Peace-Keeping: Remembering Croatia’, Cooperation
and Conflict, vol.39, no.4, 2004, pp.393-415; Duane Bratt, ‘Explaining Peacekeeping Performance: The UN in
Internal Conflicts’, International Peacekeeping, vol.4, no.3, 1997, pp.45-70; Steven R. Ratner, The UN Peace-
keeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflicts after the Cold War (New York:  St.  Martin’s  Press,  1995);  Mi-
chael W. Doyle, Ian Johnstone and Robert C. Orr, ‘Strategies for Peace: Conclusions and Lessons’, in Michael
W. Doyle, Ian Johnstone and Robert C. Orr (eds.), Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in
Cambodia and El Salvador (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.369-391.
8 Michael Wesley, Casualties of the New World Order: The Causes of Failure of UN Missions to Civil Wars
(Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1997); Pushkina, ‘Towards Successful Peace-Keeping’; Doyle and Sambanis,
Building Peace; David Carment and Dane Rowlands, ‘Three’s Company: Evaluating Third-Party Intervention in
Intrastate Conflict’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol.42, no.5, 1998, pp.572-599; Dan Smith, ‘Trends and
Causes of Armed Conflicts’, in Norbert Ropers, et al. (eds.), Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation
(n.p.: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2000); and Stephen J. Stedman, ‘Spoiler
Problems in Peace Processes’, International Security, vol.22, no.2, 1997, pp.5-53.
5expected to win the elections and for that reason only it agreed to sign the peace accords.
When this condition was not met, it was disappointed and renewed the conflict.9
Impartiality and the Non-Use of Force
It is generally thought that a peacekeeping operation needs to remain impartial and has to be
regarded as such, because otherwise it runs the risk of losing the consent of the parties and
becoming a party itself in the conflict.10 The principle of non-use of force is closely related to
impartiality as it is thought to be more likely that an operation is regarded to be impartial if
no force is used. Generally it is said that if a peacekeeping operation has lost the consent of
the parties and is regarded to be, or is, partial, its continuation requires adapting the mandate
towards war fighting.11 During the 1990s, operations like the United Nations Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) in Yugoslavia and the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in
Somalia faced huge problems amongst others because their mandates were not changed,
when they became seen as partial and they subsequently became caught in the middle ground
between peacekeeping and war fighting.12
The Brahimi report concludes that the consent of the local parties, impartiality and the
use of force only in self-defence ‘should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping’.13
However, the awareness that parties may be insincere, may withdraw consent or that their
leadership may loose control over the fighting forces as discussed under the factor ‘consent,
willingness and sincerity’ leads the Brahimi panel to weaken its own statement on the impor-
tance of impartiality and non-use of force. It acknowledges that if parties withdraw their con-
sent once an operation is deployed, the operation should also be able to defend its mandate.
Impartiality, in that case, is defined as ‘adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the
objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those Charter principles.’ In addition, the non-use of
force should, according to the Brahimi panel, in some cases also be abandoned because it is
not only ‘operationally justified’, but also ‘morally compelled’. Peacekeeping operations
should, according to the report, be willing to use force in order to defend, among others, the
9 Ibidem.
10 Evans, Cooperating for Peace.
11 Evans, Cooperating for Peace; Pushkina, ‘Towards Successful Peace-Keeping’; Bratt, ‘Explaining Peace-
keeping Performance’; Ratner, The UN Peacekeeping; and Doyle, Johnstone and Orr, ‘Strategies for Peace’.
12 Evans, Cooperating for Peace.
13 Lakhdar Brahimi, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN doc. A/55/305- S/2000/809,
21 August 2000.
6mandate and civilians.14 In the last  few years this has also been put into practise in some of
the UN peacekeeping operations.
Co-Operation from Important Outside Actors
The United Nations Secretariat names strong political support by the international community
and the provision of the resources necessary to achieve the operation’s objectives as prerequi-
sites for the success of an operation.15 Also, several scholars found that the chances for suc-
cess of a peacekeeping operation are larger if the ‘international community’ embodied by the
permanent members of the Security Council and the troop contributing countries fully sup-
port the operation and back it with funds and resources.16 Bratt points especially at the impor-
tance of support from the United States.17 The reports of the Independent Inquiry on Rwanda
and the Secretary-General on Srebrenica also argue that an important reason why the United
Nations failed in those cases was the lack of political will by the international community.18
In addition, in his Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali
warned that a lack of political will, and following from this the lack of finances at the United
Nations to implement the tasks assigned to it, is ‘dangerous’.19
Furthermore, according to Evans and Pushkina, it is necessary that outside backers
and  suppliers  of  the  belligerents  end  their  support  for  violent  means  and  stimulate  the  non-
violent resolution of the conflict.20 Wesley  and  Bratt  even  argue  that  this  link  is  one  of  the
potentially most important mechanisms of influence on the success of a peacekeeping opera-
tion. Often, member states have or have had such a sponsoring link with a conflicting party.
If these member states feel they have an interest in using their links to restrain their clients
this provides the peacekeeping operation with enormous leverage over the protagonists. It is
14 Ibidem.
15 United Nations, Basic Facts about the United Nations.
16 Evans, Cooperating for Peace; Bratt, ‘Explaining Peacekeeping Performance’; and Doyle and Sambanis,
Building Peace.
17 Bratt, ‘Explaining Peacekeeping Performance’.
18 Independent Inquiry, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the
1994 Genocide in Rwanda, UN doc. S/1999/1257, 16 December 1999; and Secretary-General, Report of the
Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica, UN doc. A/54/549,
15 November 1999.
19 Secretary-General, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occa-
sion of the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations, UN doc. A/50/60 - S/1995/1, 3 January 1995.
20 Evans, Cooperating for Peace; and Pushkina, ‘Towards Successful Peace-Keeping’.
7argued that the more dependent the protagonists are upon these links, the larger the chance
for co-operation.21
Sense of Security of the Parties
Although less prominent, several scholars argue that in order to increase the chance of a suc-
cessful disarmament and demobilisation process, an operation requires sufficient strength to
guarantee the security of the parties.22 The  conflict  and  its  history  have  often  created  a  per-
ception amongst parties that the other is not to be trusted and that one has to provide for one’s
own security against the threat of the other. The parties often face a security dilemma, in
which they have armed themselves for the purpose of self-defense. In order to stop this spiral,
to break this security dilemma and to enable disarmament and demobilization, an operation
needs to provide alternative sources for a sense of security. For this reason, parties must per-
ceive the intervention as sustained, committed and credible. Carment and Rowlands point out
that the chances for success increase strongly if the parties view that the third party is willing
to enforce the settlement.23 Strong, third-party involvement is also key in what Hampson calls
fostering ripeness. He describes ripeness as a ‘fostered, not inherited condition.’24 (see below)
According to the Brahimi report, military components of peacekeeping operations ‘must be
capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate.’25
This is a broad concept of self-defence, as it includes the possibility that peacekeeping opera-
tions have to use force and should be prepared to do so against those who target civilians or
deny humanitarian access to civilian populations. What follows from this is that peacekeep-
ing operations should not be prepared for best-case scenarios, but for worst-case scenarios.
Until 2000 the Secretariat has, however, in the view of the Brahimi-report often applied ‘best-
case planning assumptions to situations where the local actors have historically exhibited
worst-case behaviour.’26 Since the report this lesson has generally been implemented.
21 Wesley, Casualties of the New World Order; and Bratt, ‘Explaining Peacekeeping Performance’.
22 Evans, Cooperating for Peace; Pushkina, ‘Towards Successful Peace-Keeping’; Roland Paris, ‘Broadening
the Study of Peace Operations’, International Studies Review, vol.2, no.3, 2000, pp.27-44; Barbara F. Walter,
‘Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization, and Commitments to Peace’, Interna-
tional Security, vol.24, no.1, 1999, pp.127-155; Fen O. Hampson, Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements
Succeed or Fail (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996); and Carment and Rowlands,
‘Three’s Company’.
23 Carment and Rowlands, ‘Three’s Company’.
24 Hampson, Nurturing Peace.
25 Brahimi, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.
8Clear, Appropriate and Achievable Mandate
The United Nations Secretariat gives a clear mandate as a further prerequisite for the success
of an operation.27 The objectives stated in a mission’s mandate are generally regarded to be of
enormous importance to the success of a peacekeeping operation. Also the Brahimi report
views a clear, credible and achievable mandate as very important.28 The extent to which
mandates are achievable and appropriate to the situation on the ground depends on the diag-
nosis of the conflict on which the objectives are based. Therefore good planning is a neces-
sity.  Further  problems  arise  as  a  result  of  the  vagueness  of  some  peace  agreements,  which
most of the time are diplomatically phrased compromises at the end of a negotiation process.
Moreover, disagreement within the Security Council may also lead to ambiguous mandates.29
The report of the Secretary-General on the fall of Srebrenica noticed that
With the benefit of hindsight, one can see that many of the errors the United Nations made flowed from a
single and no doubt well-intentioned effort; we tried to keep the peace and apply the rules of peacekeeping
when there was no peace to keep. […] we tried to create – or imagine – an environment in which the tenets
of peacekeeping – agreement between the parties, deployment by consent, and impartiality – could be up-
held.30
Since the failures of the mid-1990s, it is now generally acknowledged that if one intervenes
in a conflict, one must realise that every phase and every level of a conflict requires different
‘policy tools’ to influence the course of the conflict, and that one cannot unthinkingly and
indiscriminately apply every sort of intervention in each phase or at each level of conflict.
Although, it is not necessarily so that specific interventions are fixed to specific phases or
levels of conflicts, the international political, as well as scholarly, community has come to the
awareness that a too free interpretation may lead to disaster. Peacekeeping, for example, is
regarded to be a rather dangerous business if a conflict has reached the level of war. In addi-
tion, in such a situation it is also a rather useless tool as there is no peace to keep.31 Finally,
26 Ibidem.
27 United Nations, Basic Facts about the United Nations.
28 Brahimi, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.
29 Wesley, Casualties of the New World Order; and Evans, Cooperating for Peace.
30 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica.
31 Conflict Prevention Network, Peace Building & Conflict Prevention in Developing Countries: A Practical
Guide (draft document) (Brussels and Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik and Conflict Prevention
Network, 1999); United Nations, General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations (Turin: United Nations De-
partment of Peace-keeping Operations, 1995); Brahimi, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Opera-
tions; Advisory Council on Peace and Security (Adviesraad Vrede en Veiligheid), Lost Innocence (Verloren
9Doyle and Sambanis found that more extensive mandates for multidimensional peacekeeping
operation are ‘highly significant determinants’ and ‘positively and significantly correlated’ to
successful peace-building.32
Timely Deployment and at the Right Time
Although a tendency exists to pay attention to conflicts only once they have reached the level
of crisis or war, intervening at such a late stage significantly decreases the possibilities for
outside actors. This reduction in potential is, according to the Conflict Prevention Network,
brought about in two respects. First, at a stage of high intensity the ‘policy tools’ to positively
influence the course of a conflict are limited. Second, since at such a late stage only little time
exists to analyse the causes of conflict, there is a tendency to react to events, rather than to
follow a proactive policy. It has, consequently, generally been acknowledged that the best
prospects  for  successful  outside  intervention  in  a  conflict  is  at  the  level  of  both  stable  and
unstable peace, either during the pre- or the post-conflict phase. Additionally, many consider
the pre-conflict phase to be the most suitable phase for intervention, as a wide variety of
measures are still available to address the root causes of the conflict and the conflict has not
yet acquire its own dynamics.33 As the saying goes: ‘an ounce of prevention is better than a
pound  of  cure.’  Likewise,  it  is  thought  that  if  conflict  can  be  prevented  many  costs  can  be
avoided, not only in terms of human lives, but even, according to Brown and Rosecrance,
financially.34 Indeed Heldt finds that, statistically, the longer the period from the start of the
conflict to the deployment of the operation, the larger the chance of continued warfare.35
Doyle and Sambanis have contradictory statistical findings. According to their re-
search the longer a conflict has raged before the United Nations enters, the larger the chance
is for success. They explained their findings by arguing that it is likely that war-weariness
strengthens the parties’ desire for peace.36 Indeed, many scholars argue, that in order for ne-
gotiations to make a chance of being successful a conflict needs to be, what Zartman calls,
‘ripe’. According to them the dynamics of a conflict must have produced a ‘mutually hurting
onschuld: Nederland en vredesoperaties) (The Hague: Adviesraad Vrede en Veiligheid, 1996); Doyle and Sam-
banis, Building Peace.
32 Doyle and Sambanis, ‘International Peacebuilding’.
33 Conflict Prevention Network, Peace Building & Conflict Prevention in Developing Countries.
34 Michael E. Brown and Ricard N. Rosecrance, The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).
35 Heldt, Conditions for Successful Intrastate Peacekeeping Missions.
36 Doyle and Sambanis, Building Peace.
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stalemate’ on the battlefield and the parties must be sufficiently exhausted in order to con-
sider a political solution to the conflict – a new equilibrium must exist. If such a deadlock is
too painful and a victory is not in sight, parties perceive negotiations as a way out. Such a
‘mutual hurting stalemate’ should, according to Zartman, be seen in the light of a simple cost-
benefit analysis. The costs of negotiations perceived by the parties should be less than the
costs of continuing the fight. As a result, the moment of ‘ripeness’ can appear and reappear
throughout the whole period of a conflict and it can be seized, as well as passed. The concept
does, however, imply that the success of peacekeeping operations, like conflict resolution in
general, largely depends upon factors intrinsic to the conflict process and third-party in-
volvement plays a less important, more accommodating role.37
Once the parties agree to the deployment of a peacekeeping operation, rapid deploy-
ment is often essential. The Brahimi report argues that the first twelve weeks following a
peace agreement or cease-fire are of enormous importance because the belligerents assess the
ability and credibility of an operation to implement its mandate most often at the start of the
mission.  Therefore,  it  is  thought  that  if  an  operation  does  not  show  these  capacities  during
this period, the consent or co-operation of the parties may be affected. At the same time, slow
deployment of a peacekeeping operation may mean the momentum for peace can be lost.38
Competent Leadership and Personnel, and Clear Command Structures
Diehl points at the importance of effective command structures to enhance the chances for
success.39 The Brahimi report went so far as to say that ‘the tenor of an entire mission can be
heavily influenced by the character and ability of those who lead it.’ However, the leadership
is  not  the  only  characteristic  of  an  operation  that  is  important,  it  is  also  other  military  and
civilian personnel whose aptitude is contributive to operational success. Additionally, the
provision of adequate equipment necessary for the operation is just as critical as the ability of
participating personnel. The explanation why leadership, personnel and command structures
are essential to the success of an operation is simple: they are the basis for the implementa-
tion of a mandate and each ‘policy tool’ of which the peacekeeping operation is comprised.40
37 I. William Zartman, ‘Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond’, in Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman
(eds.), International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War (Washington DC: National Academy Press, 2000),
pp.225-250.
38 Brahimi, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.
39 Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping: With a New Epilogue on Somalia, Bosnia, and Cambodia (Balti-
more and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).
40 Brahimi, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.
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Sufficiently Long Duration
Heldt finds that missions with longer duration have a larger chance of success than shorter
operations.41 Chesterman argues that although ‘a lengthy international presence’ does not
ensure success ‘an early departure guarantees failure’.42 Nonetheless, in order to maintain the
credibility and effectiveness of peacekeeping in general Evans holds that the United Nations
has to establish a clear termination point or clear termination criteria. To ensure that the re-
newal of mandates does not become routine, milestones measuring progress and explicit sun-
set clauses should, according to him, be included in mandates. It is according to him, how-
ever,  not always best  to take a single event as a signal for departure.  For example,  the suc-
cessful organisation of elections may not be sufficient for peace to take root.43
Internal and External Co-Ordination
Co-ordination and co-operation, both internally and externally, is regarded to be very impor-
tant for peacekeeping operations to succeed. Externally, according to the Brahimi report, op-
erations must be embedded in a broader and more comprehensive strategy to resolve the con-
flict and to build durable peace. For this purpose the operation is expected to coordinate with
organisations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United
Nations  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees  (UNHCR)  to  solve  the  underlying  causes  of  the
conflict. In this respect a single country approach is viewed to be insufficient as most often
the stabilisation of a whole region is necessary to end the conflict.44 Internally, co-ordination
and coherence also enhance the chances for success. It is, for example, according to Evans,
necessary for the peace makers and the political leadership of the operation to make peace in
order for the Military Component to keep it. Without such co-ordination, if the peacemakers
fail, the peacekeepers may become trapped between the parties.45
‘Ownership’
41 Heldt, Conditions for Successful Intrastate Peacekeeping Missions.
42 Simon Chesterman, You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration and State-Building
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
43 Evans, Cooperating for Peace.
44 Brahimi, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.
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‘Ownership’ is presently one of the major buzzwords in the peacekeeping business. Its mean-
ing is not fully clear, but includes the consent of and accountability to the local population. In
essence the local population should feel that the result of the operation is what it wanted and
that the country has not become a trusteeship occupied by a foreign military force. Nonethe-
less,  Chesterman notes that ownership can only be the end and not the means of the opera-
tion. After all, if the countries where operations are stationed were capable of ownership, they
would not need the international presence. He argues that it is the exact absence of consensus
over strategies and the conflict caused by this that calls for a peacekeeping operation to inter-
vene. However, during the process of political normalisation opportunities for more account-
ability develop and the failure to establish mechanisms to do so may also create frustration
amongst the local parties and population.46
Causes of the Conflict
Although less prominently, some scholars regard addressing the underlying causes of the
conflict to be important to prevent the resumption and recurrence of conflict.47 They argue
that efforts of reconstruction may be doomed if the causes of conflict remain because then
conflict will eventually flair up again. For example, several observers of the conflict in Bos-
nia-Herzegovina expect a resumption of the conflict once the international peacekeeping
force leaves, because the causes of the conflict will not be sufficiently addressed.48 In addi-
tion, according to Fetherston, peacekeeping operations should not be directed at negative
peace – and be relatively static – but at positive peace – and be proactive. She argues that
conflict  is  caused  by  the  frustration  of  human needs  and  is  at  least  partly  a  subjective  phe-
nomenon. Nonetheless, these social and cultural conditions that cause violent conflict can and
should, according to her, be changed by peacekeeping operations.49
Cases of UN Peace-Building Operations
45 Evans, Cooperating for Peace.
46 Chesterman, You, the People.
47 Joao Honwana, ‘Mozambique: What Nexus among Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Development?’, in Ri-
cardo R. Laremont (ed.), The Causes of War and the Consequences of Peacekeeping in Africa (Portsmouth:
Heinemann, 2002), pp.195-221.
48 Smith, ‘Trends and Causes of Armed Conflicts’.
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The Case Selection
For  the  purpose  of  this  article  a  potential  case  is  a  UN peacekeeping  operation  or  string  of
successive UN peacekeeping operations. In order to qualify for review as a case in this arti-
cle, the UN peace-building operation must meet the following criteria:
1. As the end of the Cold War has dramatically changed the international environ-
ment, the (first) operation is deployed in or after 1989.
2. In order to distinguish the ordinary UN peacekeeping operation from the UN peace-
building operation, the operation finds its origins in a peace agreement.
3.  Since  it  is  nowadays  the  most  dominant  sort  of  conflict,  especially  with  regard  to
UN peace-building operations, the operation is deployed in an intrastate conflict. For
this reason the peace agreement has to be signed by at least one sub/non-state actor.
4. In order to leave enough time to be able to measure the durability of the contribu-
tion by the operation(s), the presence of the United Nations ends before 1997.
5. In order to minimize the influence of other actors, the United Nations is the lead
organisation. This is determined by whether that organisation deployed the military
component of the operation.
Only four cases qualify to the above criteria – Cambodia, Mozambique, Rwanda and El Sal-
vador – which are portrayed shortly.
Before turning to the cases it must be stressed that although, for the purpose of meas-
uring durability, pre-1997 operations are chosen, this does not make the results of the re-
search less relevant for contemporary operations. The policy instruments implemented in the
cases studied are generally very similar to, if not the same as, those in present day operations.
Furthermore, the underlying processes that explain the cases are still the same as they follow
from the same sort of conflict processes and operational dynamics and the policy tools opera-
tions implement. The United Nations has, however, learned several lessons and is nowadays,
among other things, privy to more robust (chapter VII) mandates and a more integrated ap-
proach better able to coop with some of the problems faced in the past.
Cambodia
49 A. Beth Fetherston, ‘Putting the Peace back in to Peacekeeping: Theory Must Inform Practice’, International
Peacekeeping, vol.1, no.1, 1994, pp.3-29.
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Between 1991 and 1993 the United Nations was present in Cambodia with two operations,
the  United  Nations  Advance  Mission  in  Cambodia  (UNAMIC)  followed by  the  United  Na-
tions Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Both operations aimed to implement the
Paris Agreements between the Khmer Rouge, the Phnom Penh regime, the royalist Front Uni
National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif (FUNCINPEC)
and the republican Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF). The cold war had
drawn to an end and the major powers supported a solution for the Cambodian conflict in
order to distance themselves without the loss of face. The conflicting parties gave in to the
pressure from their patrons partly because the conflict had reached a stalemate. Nonetheless,
they lacked trust in each other and felt insecure. The agreement allowed differing interpreta-
tions, what caused disagreement and further mistrust. Unfortunately the deployment of the
UNTAC was sluggish, and its implementation was too weak according to the Khmer Rouge.
This party did not feel that UNTAC would safeguard its security if it would demobilise and
withdrew from the peace process. The Khmer Rouge felt it could survive with the support of
Thailand and China. The remaining parties decided to continue without the Khmer Rouge
under the skilful guidance of Special Representative of the Secretary General Akashi. The
Security Council supported his non-violent approach and although the Khmer Rouge threat-
ened to disturb the peace process it never did. About 360,000 refugees were repatriated and
when UNTAC left the republicans and royalists were more or less fully demobilised and dis-
armed. Furthermore, elections were successfully organised and a number of civil society or-
ganisations were established. Other issues like reintegration of refugees were less successful
due to a lack of coordination within the operation. Although the royalists won the elections,
the Phnom Penh regime managed to maintain its position in government through the threat of
violence. After the ‘coalition government’ was formed UNTAC quickly left, leaving behind
an unstable country in which the government continued to struggle for some years against the
Khmer Rouge. Nonetheless, after UNTAC left and without the continuing support of China,
Thailand and the population the Khmer Rouge was eventually doomed to waste away, as it
did in 1998. Nowadays, Cambodia is a peaceful, albeit very weak democracy.50
50 For good literature on the case study of Cambodia which has been frequently used in this research, see: Nass-
rine Azimi, The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC): Debriefing and Lessons. Report
and Recommendations of the International Conference Singapore, August 1994 (London, The Hague and Bos-
ton: Kluwer Law International, 1995); David P. Chandler, A History of Cambodia (Boulder and Oxford: West-
view Press; 2nd edition, 1996); Michael W. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia, UNTAC’s Civil Mandate
(Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Trevor Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC,
SIPRI Research Report, no.9 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Steve Heder and Judy Ledgerwood
(eds.), Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic Transition under United Nations Peace-
Keeping (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1996); Janet E. Heininger, Peacekeeping in Transition: The United Nations in
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Mozambique
The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) was deployed from 1992 to
1994. The aim of the operation was to assist in the implementation of the General Peace
Agreement, which was signed in Rome by the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique
(FRELIMO) government and Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO). Although the
conflict in Mozambique had only partly been related to the cold war, the peace process was
able  to  ride  the  wave  of  its  termination.  More  important,  however,  was  the  fact  that  in  the
meantime the apartheid regime in South Africa had ended and Pretoria started to cooperate
with Frontline States, like Mozambique. As a consequence RENAMO lost an important cor-
nerstone of its strength. Nonetheless, confidence between the parties was still very weak and
ONUMOZ’s slow deployment contributed to instability. Until after their start, the participa-
tion of RENAMO in the elections remained uncertain. Only after the first day of the elections
did the RENAMO leadership decide to participate in them, which it eventually lost. Nonethe-
less, RENAMO continued to cooperate with ONUMOZ. This is in large part due to the dip-
lomatic skills of the ONUMOZ leadership. Like in Cambodia the elections received priority
over most other issues and consequently suffered because of a lack of attention. Mozambique
would certainly not become a text book example of a well-functioning democracy because
the operation did not have sufficient time to address human rights and democracy issues.
Also the sustainability of many rehabilitation projects was limited as the United Nations De-
velopment Programme (UNDP) did not follow-up on many of these. Moreover, in some cases
the Mozambican parties felt solutions were externally imposed. Nonetheless, the demilitariza-
tion of the country was eventually nearly complete and the struggle between RENAMO and
FRELIMO was, in the end, continued within the political arena.51
Cambodia (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994); Sorpong Peou, Conflict Neutralization in the
Cambodia War: From Battlefield to Ballot-Box (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1997); David W.
Roberts, Political Transition in Cambodia 1991-1999: Power, Elitism and Democracy (Cornwall: Curzon,
2001); and United Nations, The United Nations and Cambodia: 1991-1995, Blue Books Series, No.2 (New
York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1995).
51 For good literature on the case study of Mozambique which has been frequently used in this research, see:
Chris Alden, ‘The UN and the Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique’, Journal of Modern African Studies,
vol.33, no.1, 1995, pp.103-128; Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson and Alex Vines, ‘The Mozambican Peace
Process in Perspective’, Accord, no. 3, (London: Conciliation Resources, 1998); Cameron Hume, Ending Mo-
zambique’s War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace
Press, 1994); Dennis C. Jett, ‘Lessons Unlearned: Or Why Mozambique’s Successful Peacekeeping Operation
Might Not Be Replicated Elsewhere’, Journal of Humanitarian Assistance (http://www.jha.ac/Ref/aar008.htm)
(document posted 2002); Malyn Newitt, A History of Mozambique (London: Hurst, 1995); Richard Synge, Mo-
zambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action 1992-94 (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997);
United Nations, The United Nations and Mozambique: 1992-1995, Blue Books Series, no.5 (New York: United
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Rwanda
In 1993 de United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was deployed on the
basis of the Arusha Peace Agreement. This agreement between the Government of Rwanda
and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was very detailed in many aspects, but did not pro-
vide the United Nations with a role on many essential issues that caused the conflict to begin,
such  as  human rights  and  elections.  Next  to  France  no  other  major  power  was  interested  in
the developments in Rwanda. This was expressed in the size and mandate of the operation.
Moreover, although President Habyarimana had signed the agreement under heavy pressure
from the international community, a large share of his supporters fiercely opposed it.
UNAMIR was deployed relatively rapidly, but still later than the parties had hoped it would.
As a consequence a number of deadlines were not reached and distrust between the parties
became even stronger. After the civil war between Hutu and Tutsi flared up again in
neighbouring Burundi, inter-ethnic relations within Rwanda polarized sharply. Implementa-
tion of a number of issues lagged further behind and the Security Council hoped to pressure
the parties by threatening to withdraw UNAMIR if deadlines were not met. When, subse-
quently, President Habyarimana was killed when his plane was shot down, the Hutu elite, out
of fear for loosing their position and overwhelmingly supported by the Hutu population,
started a genocide on the Tutsi. Next, UNAMIR and the rest of the international community
stood by and watched from the sideline when about 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were
slaughtered. Special Representative of the Secretary-General Booh Booh hoped to mediate a
truth between the parties, in the face of genocide, which the RPF rejected. Worse, the capac-
ity of UNAMIR was decreased out of fear for the lives of the peacekeepers. The only major
power willing to intervene, France, had supported the Hutu elites for many years. Eventually
the  genocide  was  only  ended  by  the  RPF when it  took  over  power.  Millions  of  Hutu,  how-
ever, fled to Zaire and Tanzania out of fear of this RPF advance. The French did establish the
zone Turquoise to alleviate the humanitarian situation, but this region was also where the
genocide continued longest. In spite of the fact that UNAMIR remained in Rwanda until
1996,  with  the  genocide  it  lost  its  aim  to  implement  the  Arusha  Agreement.  Under  the  au-
thoritarian regime of the RPF the tensions between the Tutsi and the Hutu were not removed,
Nations Department of Public Information, 1995); Alex Vines, RENAMO: From Terrorism to Democracy in
Mozambique? (London: James Currey, revised and updated edition, 1996).
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but merely suppressed. Nonetheless, for the time being Rwanda knows relative negative
peace, albeit at the cost of stability in the Democratic Republic of Congo.52
El Salvador
The United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) commenced in 1991 to
implement the Agreement on Human Rights agreement between the Government of El Sal-
vador and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN). In 1992, after
the signing of the Chapultepec Agreement, in addition to the human rights component, the
rest of the operation was quickly deployed. Confidence between the parties remained absent
for a long time and the implementation of the accord had to be renegotiated continuously.
The leadership of ONUSAL was essential in the success of these renegotiations. During this
process the role of ONUSAL only increased further, enabling it to gain more and more con-
trol of the peace process. The peace process was close to collapse when secret arms caches of
the FMLN were discovered, while at the same time right wing death squads continued to op-
erate. Nonetheless, the conflicting parties chose to continue on the road to peace. They were
supported to stay on this road by not only ONUSAL but also a broader group of amongst
other partners civil society, the neighbouring countries, Washington DC and Moscow. Coop-
eration between ONUSAL and especially the World Bank was, however, sometimes difficult.
The World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programmes barely allowed sufficient funds for the
government to pay for the demilitarisation of the country. Although the FMLN lost the elec-
tions, it successfully made the transition from rebel organisation to political party, and par-
ticipated fully in a peaceful and democratic country. In 1995 ONUSAL ended, when El Sal-
vador was demilitarised, effectively ending one of the last cold war proxy wars.53
52 For good literature on the case study of Rwanda which has been frequently used in this research, see: Howard
Adelman and Astrid Suhrke, The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire (New Bruns-
wick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1999); Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Na-
tions and Rwanda (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2002); Romeo Dallaire [with Brent Beardsley],
Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003).
Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (New York: Human Rights Watch,
1999); Bruce D. Jones, Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure (Boulder and London: Lynne Rien-
ner, 2001); Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press,
1997); Filip Reyntjens, Rwanda. Trois jours qui ont fait basculer l'histoire, Cahiers Africains, no.16 (Brussels
and Paris: Institut Africain-CEDAF, 1995); United Nations, The United Nations and Rwanda: 1993-1996, Blue
Books Series, no.10 (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996); Peter Uvin, Aiding
Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda (West Harford: Kumarian Press, 1998); and Peter Uvin,
‘Reading the Rwandan Genocide’, International Studies Review, vol.3, no.3, 2001, pp.75-99.
53 For good literature on the case study of El Salvador which has been frequently used in this research, see: Ian
Johnstone, Rights and Reconciliation: UN Strategies in El Salvador (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner,
1995); Terry L. Karl, ‘El Salvador’s Negotiated Revolution’, Foreign Affairs, vol.71, no.2, 1992, pp.147-164;
Tommie S. Montgomery, ‘Getting to Peace in El Salvador: The Roles of the United Nations Secretariat and
ONUSAL’, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol.37, no.4, 1995, pp.139-172; Margaret Pop-
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Factors for Success and Failure UN Peace-Building Operations: The Cases
Consent, Willingness and Sincerity
The cases show that only if parties have the sincere intention to come to peace, a UN peace-
building operation can contribute to durable peace. In Mozambique and El Salvador this sin-
cere intention was present amongst all parties because, among other reasons, the opposition
parties did not have alternative ways to finance the struggle. In both Cambodia and Rwanda
the ‘spoilers’ saw an alternative road of conflict, which was preferred to the peace process. In
Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge was either not sincere or lost faith in the process at the begin-
ning of the operation, when it started to regard UNTAC as too weak of a security guarantee
and saw no alternatives to conflict.  Moreover,  it  was able to continue the struggle for a few
more years as it controlled a gem and logging industry. The lack of sincerity of the Phnom
Penh regime became obvious when, after losing the elections, it resorted to the threat of vio-
lence to remain in power. In the case of Rwanda the implementation of the Arusha Agree-
ment  was  not  in  the  interest  of  the  Hutu  extremists,  as  it  was  likely  that  after  the  elections
they would no longer be able to reap the privileges and incomes of their government posi-
tions. Among other reasons, to defend these positions they subsequently started the genocide
in which they killed the competitors for their jobs. However, the RPF was also eager to pick
up arms again, because it felt that due to international intervention it had not been able to
fully pursue the military option. The reason why willingness and sincerity is needed is that,
not even taking into account the discussion whether one can enforce peace upon unwilling
parties, peace-building operations, even when mandated under chapter VII of the Charter, are
generally neither prepared, nor equipped and sized to fight wars. Both UNTAC and
UNAMIR proved to be unable to deal with the ‘spoilers’.
Impartiality and the Non-Use of Force
kin, Peace without Justice: Obstacles to Building the Rule of Law in El Salvador (University Park: Pennsylvania
State University Press, 2000); Salvador Samayoa, El Salvador: La reforma pactada (San Salvador: UCA Edi-
tores, 2003); United Nations, The United Nations and El Salvador: 1990-1995, Blue Books Series, no.4 (New
York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1995).
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The principle of non-use of force is, according to this research, not relevant to the success or
failure of an operation. Rather the opposite, the use of force or at least the threat of it may be
important to ensure success. In Rwanda this is the case as, according to force commander
Dallaire, the use of force might have prevented the genocide.54 Also in Cambodia one may
wonder whether a tougher stance would not have improved the result.55 In Mozambique and
El Salvador there was never the need to use force. Nonetheless, all parties reasoned they
would receive support from the ‘international community’ if others would break the peace
agreement. As such, it appears from the cases that credibility of the threat of the use of force
is of great importance to the factor ‘sense of security of the parties’ (see below). Parties feel
more secure if they know that if the others in the peace process do not keep up their part of
the bargain, they will be defended against them. This may include the use of force. Impartial-
ity, on the other hand, is a border that may be dangerous to cross, as it follows from all cases
that fighting a war was neither in the mandate of the UN peace-building operations, nor were
the operations prepared, equipped and sized for it.
Co-Operation from Important Outside Actors
The cases show that, as found in the literature on UN peacekeeping operations, without the
co-operation of neighbouring countries and the permanent members of the Security Council
the chances for a positive contribution by a UN peace-building operation to durable peace
decreases strongly. Support of the permanent members of the Security Council is important
because unity in the Council is not only needed to provide the mandate and resources, but can
also be used to pressure proxies into compliance. The co-operation from neighbouring coun-
tries is essential because often these countries support one of the parties and many policy
instruments, like the monitoring of borders and the verification of the withdrawal of foreign
forces,  require  their  assistance.  In  Mozambique  and  El  Salvador  due  to  the  end  of  the  cold
war the international conflict ended, but also the regional conflict was terminated. Conse-
quently the Security Council and the neighbouring countries fully supported the UN peace-
building operations present. In Cambodia, although the Security Council and Thailand had
formally agreed with the Paris Agreement, in practise the co-operation of Thailand and China
with UNTAC was not optimal. Both continued to support the Khmer Rouge and Thailand
54 Scot R. Feil, Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda (New
York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1998).
55 Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC.
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frustrated  the  establishment  of  border  control  posts  at  its  territory.  Rwanda  lacked  a  major
characteristic of the other three conflicts; it was not a cold war proxy conflict. As a result, the
United States, Russia and China lacked interests and remained less involved, while countries
such as France, Uganda and Zaire continued their support to the parties.
Sense of Security of the Parties
Also from the cases it appears that a short term danger is lurking at the start of the operation,
because although the parties may view the projected durable peace as the best alternative, the
road towards that future will be perceived as and often is bumpy. The parties perceive their
security to increase through cease-fire monitoring, especially if a credible, large, well trained
and equipped, and robustly mandated force is thought to come to their rescue when needed
during the demilitarisation process. Also the monitoring of human rights, the civilian police
and  the  civil  administration  can  contribute  to  this  sense  of  security.  In  Rwanda,  UNAMIR
was unable to provide in such a sense of security. Both sides feared being massacred by the
other and as they knew UNAMIR would not act in such a case, they rearmed. In Cambodia,
the Khmer Rouge felt insecure as it deemed UNTAC too weak and inactive. It decided to
leave the peace process, which in turn held back the Phnom Penh regime from demilitarising.
In El Salvador and, to a lesser extent, Mozambique the operations were much more able to
provide  the  needed  sense  of  security.  Nonetheless,  even  in  those  two cases  the  parties  held
back secret arms caches to be used when they felt the military option would be more fruitful
than negotiation.
Clear, Appropriate and Achievable Mandate
Although in the literature a clear, appropriate and achievable mandate is regarded to be of
great importance for the implementation and success of an operation, the cases do not neces-
sarily confirm this for UN peace-building operations. The Arusha peace agreement, the basis
for the mandate of UNAMIR, is one of the most detailed accords, but was not able to prevent
the  genocide  in  Rwanda.  Yet,  in  the  case  of  El  Salvador  the  vagueness  of  the  Chapultepec
agreement allowed ONUSAL to slowly grow and direct the peace process. As a result of the
need to continue the negotiations during the presence of the operation, ONUSAL was able to
21
create a ‘carefully-chosen, constructive “mission creep”’.56 It has to be said though that in the
case of Cambodia, the Paris Peace Agreements were sufficiently vague to allow mistrust to
trickle in. Consequently, the role of clarity of and detail in mandates is still not clear. It ap-
pears, however, that half-hearted or compromise mandates are inherently dangerous. This is
especially relevant regarding the mandate that is finally negotiated in the Security Council. If
the permanent five disagree or only reluctantly agree this may provide operations with an
inadequate mandate or with inadequate means to implement mandates. This was the case in
Rwanda and partially in Cambodia, but much less so in the other two cases. Such half-hearted
compromise Security Council mandates and inadequate means are much more the crux of the
problem. Nonetheless, this has already been treated under the factor ‘Co-operation from im-
portant outside actors’.
Timely Deployment and at the Right Time
It follows from the cases that, indeed, the interval between the signing of the peace agreement
and the deployment of the UN peace-building operation should be kept to a minimum. The
fact that in Rwanda the deployment of UNAMIR was later than the parties planned contrib-
uted  to  the  parties’  loss  of  trust  in  the  deadlines  of  their  agreements  and  in  each  other.  In
Cambodia and Mozambique, the slow and late deployment of the operations also contributed
to instability, especially during the start of the operation. In the case of Cambodia this is also
likely to have contributed to the decision of the Khmer Rouge to leave the peace process. In
El  Salvador  the  human  rights  division  was  already  present  before  the  signing  of  the  peace
agreement and the military component was transferred immediately from the United Nations
Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA). As a result, the situation remained more sta-
ble.
The case studies demonstrate that right timing is very important to the contribution of
an operation as well. In El Salvador and Mozambique the conflicts were ripe for resolution
and both parties saw future possibilities to continue the conflict diminish. In Cambodia a mu-
tually hurting stalemate had appeared on the battlefield, but the Khmer Rouge remained bel-
ligerent for a few more years.  In Rwanda the conflict  was not ripe at  all,  as both parties ar-
gued there was more to win in the continuation of the conflict. They were, however, pushed
56 William Stanley and David Holiday, ‘Peace Mission Strategy and Domestic Actors: UN Mediation, Verifica-
tion and Institution-Building in El Salvador’, International Peacekeeping, vol.4, no.2, 1997, pp.22-49.
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to the negotiations table by the international community. Thus, if a conflict is not yet ripe, a
UN peace-building operation cannot play its accommodating role.
Competent Leadership and Personnel, and Clear Command Structures
From the case studies as well it appears that leadership is important, especially with regard to
the continuing mediation role during the presence of an operation. In Mozambique Ajello
managed to shepherd the peace process and ONUMOZ through critical moments, especially
at  the  time  of  the  elections.  In  El  Salvador  the  leadership  of  Riza,  Ocampo  and  Ter  Horst,
aided by Goulding, was essential in continuous renegotiations. This leadership was absent in
Rwanda where Booh-Booh was not respected and not taken serious by the parties. Although
Akashi, in Cambodia, skilfully managed to continue the peace process in spite of all the prob-
lems, he has been criticised for not taking a stronger approach. His critics argue that a tougher
stance might have prevented the problems all together. Furthermore, in all four cases the op-
erations suffered from incompetent military and civilian police officers, who often became a
public relations problem. Clear command structures proved to be important especially in ex-
treme  situations.  In  the  case  of  Rwanda  the  lack  of  clarity  and  friction  between  Kigali  and
UN headquarters in New York caused UNAMIR and New York to make the wrong decisions
at a time of genocide.57
Sufficiently Long Duration
The cases show that, indeed, in order to contribute sufficiently to negative peace and espe-
cially to address the causes of the conflict, time is needed. Based upon considerations of cost
the Security Council, however, tries to keep the duration of the operation to a minimum and
consequently drawdown is frequently started before the situation on the ground allows it,
thereby preventing the creation of negative peace. In Mozambique and Cambodia this led to a
deteriorated security situation and in the case of Mozambique, especially, to the premature
end of the disarmament process. In Rwanda the United Nations even threatened to withdraw
its  forces  and  partially  did  so  later  when those  who committed  the  genocide  could  only  ap-
plaud the drawdown. El Salvador was the only case where the military component stayed
sufficiently  long  to  implement  all  of  its  tasks.  In  all  four  cases  the  causes  of  conflict  were
57 Independent Inquiry, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the
1994 Genocide in Rwanda.
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only partly addressed, because to deal with them is a long process which cannot be finished
within a time frame limited by Security Council demands for financial parsimony. Conse-
quently, many of these processes were started by the UN peace-building operation, but criti-
cal follow-up work was the aegis of other organizations in the field, like UNDP, the World
Bank,  and  the  UNHCR.  This  was  not  always  sufficient.  Nonetheless,  the  cases  show that  a
long duration of a UN peace-building operation is not necessarily needed if the operation is
embedded into the long-term approach of the organizations on the ground.
Internal and External Co-Ordination
Also from the case studies, it follows that internal and external co-ordination is very impor-
tant. As the implementation of policy tools is not a singular process, but instead relies on the
successful implementation of other policy tools, internal co-ordination is paramount. There
were two problems in the cases in this respect. First, important policy tools were sometimes
rushed in order to be completed in time for another. In the name of expediency, quality was
sacrificed. In Cambodia and Mozambique, for example, the operations had to rush, inter alia,
demobilisation and repatriation to facilitate elections. Second, two complementary policy
tools sometimes failed to link up with each other and then a too large window of time could
arise between these two processes. In such a case, it was the quality of the second policy tool
that suffered. This problem was present in all cases where reintegration followed repatriation
of refugees and reintegration followed demobilisation of ex-combatants. External co-
ordination also faced two problems. First, during the operation, other organisations, like non-
governmental organisations and international financial institutions, did not retreat and contin-
ued to be active. Thus, their actions sometimes thwarted each other because they were not
always sufficiently co-ordinated. In the case of El Salvador, De Soto described the co-
operative context between the World Bank and ONUSAL as two doctors working on a pa-
tient without knowing what the other one is doing.58 Second, since after the departure of an
operation the results of some policy tools must be maintained – e.g. newly built bridges or
improved human rights situations – the lack of co-ordination with the organisation responsi-
ble for the follow-up sometimes affected the sustainability of the contribution. In all four
cases, the co-ordination with UNDP, was  especially important, because the organisation had
to continue good governance, disarmament and reintegration programmes.
58 Alvaro De Soto and Graciana del Castillo, ‘Obstacles to Peacebuilding’, Foreign Policy, no.94, 1994, pp.69-
83.
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‘Ownership’
The cases show that something like ‘ownership’ is needed to ensure that the contribution
made by the operation is sustainable. During the presence of an operation, placing the parties
at the same table to confront concrete problems functioned not only to provide them with
‘ownership’ of the process, but also to reconcile their problems. In Mozambique the talks on
humanitarian aid and in Cambodia on day-to-day military affairs contributed to this. None-
theless, in all cases parties complained that they were not sufficiently involved in decisions
on what should be done and what was important. Especially in Mozambique this left them
with the impression that some solutions were imposed, which undermined their intentions to
cultivate positive outcomes. This brings us to the problem of ‘ownership’ after the departure
of the operation. In all cases the new governments tended to view the improvements in hu-
man rights and good governance not to be their own. The parties tended to fall back into their
habits of lacking of good governance, ruling autocratically and violating human rights. Cam-
bodia and El Salvador show, however, that involving civil society enhances ‘ownership’ for
the future. In those cases human rights organisations were incorporated and aided to counter-
balance the pernicious habits of the governments.
Causes of the Conflict
The factor ‘causes of the conflict’ proves to be very important in the cases. The more causes
were addressed – the breadth – and the more attention was given to each cause – the depth,
the more successful the operation. In El Salvador, Cambodia and Mozambique more attention
was given to the causes of conflict than in Rwanda. It is very likely that this explains the dif-
ferent outcome for Rwanda. Moreover, in El Salvador this attention was more thorough than
in Cambodia and Mozambique, which contributed to the more stable situation in the first
case. In the short term, the lack of good governance and the lack of legitimacy of the gov-
ernment were important causes of conflict to be addressed. Particularly in El Salvador the
causes of conflict were addressed in depth. In Mozambique and Cambodia this was done as
well, although to a lesser extent. In Rwanda, while these two causes lay at the exact heart of
the conflict, UNAMIR barely touched upon good governance issues and the legitimacy of the
government was not even intended to be addressed. In the long run, however, the other causes
of conflict need to be addressed as well. Nonetheless, although economic issues are important
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causes of conflict, they received very little or no attention at all. The same is the case with the
improvement of the relations between the conflicting groups, although national reconciliation
is often especially regarded as the basis for durable peace. Also the strength of the state and
its institutions, vital for stability in the long-term, received too often too little attention.
Conclusions
Testing the clusters of factors for success and failure for UN peacekeeping operations, as
gathered from literature, against the four case studies of UN peace-building operations shows
that this research confirms eight of the eleven factors found in literature without conditions.
‘Consent, willingness and sincerity’, ‘Co-operation from important outside actors’, ‘Sense of
security of the parties’, ‘Timely deployment and at the right time’, ‘Competent leadership and
personnel, and clear command structures’, ‘Internal and external co-ordination’, ‘Ownership’
and ‘Causes of the conflict’ prove to be also very important factors for success and failure of
UN peace-building operations. Nonetheless, in the case studies of UN peace-building opera-
tions the factors ‘Sense of security of the parties’ and ‘Causes of the conflict’ appear to be
more important than in the literature on UN peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, in princi-
ple, the factor ‘Sufficiently long duration’ is also confirmed, but might be better rephrased to
include the fact that embedding the UN peace-building operation into a long-term approach
might make long duration unnecessary. Finally, the factors ‘Impartiality and the non-use of
force’ and ‘Clear, appropriate and achievable mandate’ are, however, rejected. The use of
force or at least the threat of it may sometimes be necessary to help the parties to feel secure.
A vague mandate may sometimes be very useful to expand the influence of the operation,
while a detailed mandate sometimes provides too many hurdles not to stumble.
In short, although the established theory of factors for success and failure for UN
peacekeeping operations largely prove to be valid for the four cases of UN peace-building
operations, the above proves that theory of UN peace-building operations still needs adjust-
ment and fine tuning. Some of these adjustments are lessons which also have been learned in
the practice of the UN peacekeeping operations deployed since the time of the four case stud-
ies. Present-day UN peace-building operations are, for example, generally robustly mandated.
Albeit the research of the last ten to fifteen years has produced a lot of theory and knowledge,
it has so far not fully produced a blueprint for successful UN peace-building operations. Ad-
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vanced research, but also the new experiences of future operations, will hopefully provide
more pieces to further solve this puzzle.
